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CLASS ACTION LITIGATION:
REPRESENTING DIVERGENT INTERESTS OF
CLASS MEMBERS*
By Julius L. Chambers**
At a recent conference with class members in an extended employment discrimination proceeding, Hairston v. McLean Trucking Co.,'
one disgruntled class member, among sixty-seven and one of seventeen
named plaintiffs asked me: "Lawyer, who do you represent in this
proceeding?" Forty of the class members and sixteen of the named
plaintiffs were at that time reasonably satisfied with a backpay settlement proposal. One class member and one plaintiff objected
vehemently. I advised the group that the settlement was reasonable and
that they should accept it. The objector's question, however, did
seriously concern me.
We had been litigating the case for ten years. During this period
there had been no division in the ranks of the plaintiffs and the class.
All of them were interested in a determination which would insure better job opportunities for blacks and compensation for earnings they
had lost because of the employer's discrimination. Some, however,
had better claims than others: some had been with the employer
longer; some had expressly rejected opportunities to move to better
jobs; some were admittedly unable to perform the better jobs. Not*A speech presented to the Black American Law Students Association of The
University of Dayton School of Law on September 29, 1978.
**President, Legal Defense Fund. Partner, Chambers, Stein, Ferguson & Becton,
P.A., Charlotte, North Carolina. B.A., North Carolina Central University (1958);
M.A., University of Michigan (1959); L.L.B., University of North Carolina (1962);
M.L., Columbia University (1963). Member: North Carolina and American Bar
Associations.
1. 520 F.2d 226 (4th Cir. 1975). Hairston was a Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 200e et
seq., proceeding alleging that McLean Trucking Corporation, its maintenance division, Modern Automotive Services, and the union representative, International
Brotherhood of Teamsters and its local, discriminated against black employees in
employment practices because of race. The district court rendered a decision on the
merits in 1974, finding that both defendants had discriminated against the plaintiffs
and other black employees in the certified class in violation of Title VII. 62 F.R.D. 642
(M.D. N.C. 1974). The Fourth Circuit affirmed the liability determination but ordered
additional relief for the plaintiffs and the class in light of Albemarle Paper Co. v.
Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975). Prior to resolution of the remedies phase of the proceeding, the Supreme Court decided International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United
States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977), which held that section 703(h) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-3(h), protected bona fide seniority systems. Teamsters substantially affected the
liability determination and the type of relief which could be granted.
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withstanding, the disgruntled class member insisted that each class
member and plaintiff receive an equal sum of the backpay award.'
From my representation of the parties in the proceeding, I knew
the weakness of the claims of the objecting class member and plaintiff.
Under these circumstances, was I to withdraw from the proceeding,
continue to represent all parties and ignore the objection, or represent
those who assented and insist that the objectors retain other counsel?
In McLean Trucking, my obligation was to limit the class to those
with like or similar interests, to seek a division of the class in order to
accommodate separate claims or facts and to request separate
representation for those of the class who objected to or opposed the
relief being sought. The Fifth Circuit in Pettway v. American Cast
Iron Pipe Co.3 and the Fourth Circuit in Flinn v. FMC Corp.' have
tried to provide some guidance for counsel and the court where conflicting interests develop. The named plaintiff remains in charge of the
case subject to the strictures of Rule 23 as to fairness and adequacy of
representation.' Counsel for the plaintiff has an obligation to advise
the plaintiff and the court with respect to the plaintiff's rights and in6
terests and any competing interests of the class.
Fortunately, in this case, the objectors retained other counsel and
did not question my continued representation of the assenting plaintiffs and class members. The potential dilemma I faced regarding the
lawyer-client relationship, however, is one public interest attorneys are
encountering rather frequently today. The question arises not just in
the context of relief. It is frequently presented in consideration of the
substantive claims, for example, whether race or sex discrimination
are illegal or unconstitutional; whether racial isolation, defacto rather
than de jure, is unconstitutional. It is also posed when considering the
extent of the client's involvement in the lawsuit. For instance, does the
attorney or the client determine the relief which should be requested,
whether to appeal, and so forth?
Even before my class problem arose in McLean Trucking Co.,
Professor Derrick Bell had furthered my interest in this area with his
article in the Yale Law Journal entitled Serving Two Masters: Integra2. The objectors contended that if the monetary reward were not distributed
equally, the court should conduct a hearing on each individual claim.
3. 576 F.2d 1157 (5th Cir. 1978).
4. 528 F.2d 1169 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 967 (1976).
5. FED. R. Civ. P. 23. "In the conduct of actions to which this rule applies, the
members
court may make appropriate orders: . . . requiring, for the protection of the
signify
of the class . . . that notice be given . . of the opportunity of members to
P.
CIv.
R.
FED.
."
....
adequate
and
fair
representation
the
whether they consider
23(d).
6. 576 F.2d at 1178.

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol4/iss2/7

19791

CLASS ACTION LITIGATION

tion Ideals and Client Interests in School Desegregation Litigation.'
Professor Bell argued that civil rights attorneys in school desegregation
cases, citing as examples the NAACP and the Legal Defense Fund,
were ignoring changing client interests in these cases by unilaterally advocating desegregation through racial balancing strategies.' He contended that there was strong evidence that client interests had shifted
from supporting racially balanced schools to advocating concentrated
improvement of educational programs in existing segregated or racially
identifiable systems, and that a growing number of urban parents had
become skeptical about any positive effects of school desegregation. 9
Although I strongly object to most of Professor Bell's
argument,
the article did highlight a major problem with regard to the lawyerclient relationship around control of decisions affecting litigation. Professor Bell accused lawyers of usurping client control over the litigation
by ignoring client interests when they differed from the preferences
and goals of the lawyers.'" He also argued that this relationship was
too strongly influenced by third parties-civil rights organizations
which funded the litigation."I
An inherent problem in this lawyer-client issue which Professor
Bell fails to mention is the often wide socio-economic disparity between the average civil rights attorney and the average client or class
member in a civil rights case. This social distance can create problems
in the relationship. I have seen that in some cases the attorney as "the
professional" does act toward lay client/class members in sometimes
paternalistic, often overly aggressive, controlling, or patronizing ways.
7.
8.

85 YALE L.J. 470 (1976).
Id. at 483-87.

9. Id. at 480.
10. Id. at 490, 493, 512.
11. Id. at 497-500. Professor Bell ignored the traditional commitment and objectives of the third party organizations he criticized. The NAACP and the NAACP Legal
Defense Fund (LDF), for instance, were organized to challenge racially discriminatory
practices. Their efforts resulted in the Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. Board of
Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). While individuals may disagree with the objectives of
these organizations, their efforts and the procedure they followed have been held to be
in the highest tradition of American jurisprudence. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415
(1963); In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978).
After obtaining the Brown ruling, the LDF and the NAACP set about implementing
the decision. The history of these efforts has been told many times and will not be
repeated here. See, e.g., R. KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE (1976). The point is that at least
a vocal majority of the members of the organizations and the clients they sought to
represent were interested in challenging the exclusion of black children from public
schools reserved for white children. Similarly in other civil rights and public interest
areas, individual plaintiffs, in addition to counsel and third party organizations, have
challenged practices which deprived them of what they believed to be their constitutionally or federally protected rights. They are entitled to their day in court.
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Clearly this problem should be more closely examined by the profession.
In addition, in many of the class action proceedings, counsel for
plaintiffs may be able to talk or consult with all class members, if at
all, 2 only at the later stages of the proceeding. The initial objective of
the suit is generally known and broadly accepted. When conflicts
develop, they are usually at the remedy stage, for example, in school
discrimination, whether there should be reorganization of the school
system, new attendance zones, transportation of students, or the
elimination of grouping practices of students, or, in employment
discrimination, whether the goals and timetables and adjustments of
seniority are appropriate, and whether back pay should be on a per
capita basis or specifically limited to provable violations.
Professor Bell's assertions have met with considerable opposition
in the field,' 3 but they have served to direct the profession's attention
to the issue of client rights in civil rights litigation. This is an appropriate and important issue and it raises a series of more basic questions such as: Given the socio-economic differential between lawyer
and client/class member in civil rights cases, how do we realistically
function so that the clients have information equal to other parties
such as the lawyers and funding organizations? How do we maintain
informed interest among clients in long-term desegregation cases? How
do we respond to the increased potential for division among class
members when more informed and active participation is expected of
them?
All Clients Have a Basic Right to Representation
In reality, there are articulate members of minorities which are
discriminated against who, for any number of reasons, prefer not to
oppose discrimination waged against them. Some of these members actually prefer their separate and unequal status. For example, the Equal
Rights Amendment has not faced defeat solely from male chauvinists.
The most visible opposition forces are women themselves. Also,
throughout the history of the race relations dilemma in the United
States, blacks as a group have experienced deep cleavages among the
rank and file and leadership, on the pros and cons of segregation as
the best solution to the American race problem.
12. For example, some courts have adopted rules limiting communications with
class members except by prior court approval. See, e.g., Cole v. Marsh, 560 F.2d 186
(3rd Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 985 (1977).
13. See, e.g., Nathaniel R. Jones', General Counsel for the NAACP, response to
the article, 86 YALE L.J. 378 (1976) and Professor Bell's reply, id. at 382.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol4/iss2/7
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Should these groups be denied quality representation simply
because they oppose the views and goals of the majority? For instance,
in the case of a class action when differences occur between the
members on the position being taken by the attorney, do both sets of
interests deserve representation? To me, the answer is obvious: every
client is entitled to representation of his or her interest.
This is a complicated issue. There may arise a difference between
an individual client and his or her attorney on the position of the case.
Or there may occur a division within the ranks of the class, and an individual or a minority of class members may oppose the position of the
other class members and the attorney.
In such cases, even if a clear majority, as indicated by vote, supports one position, the opposing minority position is still entitled to
representation. The attorney should not ignore the clients' interests or
preferences and advocate his or her own preferences to the point of denying representation. Those of the minority position ought to seek
legal representation from an attorney willing to represent that position.
Further, it appears both fair and logical in a case where there is
division within the class that the attorney ought to have the opportunity to continue to represent the position of that side of the split class
which he or she supports. Some may argue that this gives the attorney
an unfair advantage over those who split the class for an opposing
position, and urge that the attorney drop out all together and that
totally new actions be filed. This need not be the case. Although a
good deal of knowledge and experience might have been gained in the
early stages of the case, such information need not in and of itself
jeopardize or unfairly unbalance the case of the opposition. In fact,
since the opposing client(s) were members of the original suit, they
leave the class with the advantage of having gained important information with which to wage their opposition.
On the other hand, if a majority of the class or the named plaintiffs are opposed to the position of counsel for the plaintiff, counsel
and the court should limit the representation. If all plaintiffs and class
members are opposed and plaintiffs' counsel cannot effectively represent their interests, plaintiffs' counsel should withdraw from the proceedings.
The underlying constitutional issue here is the right of each client
position to representation and the necessity that lawyers continue to
exhibit respect for these client rights, regardless of their views.
In obtaining the Brown v. Board of Education decision,' the
NAACP had to find and refer clients. Many did not know their rights
14.

347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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their right to representation or the availability of attorneys who
would represent them. And since blacks are not a monolithic group,
some were opposed to the entire Brown effort.
The Supreme Court, in NAACP v. Button'", held that this major
effort was in the tradition of the American ideal. It was a clear example of blacks exercising their First Amendment rights of freedom of
speech and association. This position was reaffirmed just last term in
In re Primus.I6 There, an ACLU attorney, who advised an individual
of her constitutional rights and that the ACLU would assist her in protecting her rights without cost, was held to be acting "within the
Amendment protection reserved for associagenerous zone of' First
7
1
freedoms.'
tional
Primus, however, as well as Button, are not without limitations.
Thus, a state may proscribe in-person misleading or fraudulent
8
solicitations designed to financially reward an attorney.' Justice
Powell, in Primus, suggests that a state may limit solicitation by
lawyers on behalf of lay organizations that exert actual control over
the litigation. 9 It seems clear from Button and Primus, however, as
well as Bates v. State Bar of Arizona2", that an attorney may solicit or
accept referrals of clients in order to advance particular philosophical
or constitutional goals in court, even where the attorney is compensated for his or her efforts pursuant to a rule of court or a statutory
organization does
provision. This is particularly true where a funding
2
not maintain primary control over the litigation. '
Further, there is another potential advantage of more varied civil
rights representation where there, in fact, exist substantially different
views on issues such as school desegregation strategies or employment
discrimination remedies. Diverse arguments and approaches by plaintiffs on specific public interest issues could result in a greater number
of more clearly framed cases, lessen the ambiguities on the central
issues, and improve the overall quality of public interest litigation.
Finally, the growing concern for client rights also focuses greater
attention on the need for more interdisciplinary approaches to
litigating public interest cases. There is need for more input from and
consultation with social scientists, psychologists, economists, labor
consultants, criminologists, and other behavioral scientists who can aid
-

15. 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
16. 436 U.S. 412 (1978).
17. , Id. at 431.
18. Id. at 438-39. Ohralik v.Ohio St. B. Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
19. 436 U.S. at 439.
20. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
21. 436 U.S. at 439.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol4/iss2/7
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the legal profession in working through the dynamics of the lawyerclient relationship to facilitate greater client awareness and involvement.
In all this there can be no substitute for continuing our commitment to a pluralistic ideal in which differences and diversity among interest groups are maintained and the rights of the minority to be heard
are protected as forcefully as those of the majority.
Subscribing to this ideal does not mean that we abandon traditional goals of desegregation cases. Believers in desegregation simply
have to face internal conflicts more squarely. We have to work even
harder to build a strong enough case to convince the courts that the
desegregation position is the most feasible and desirable to be pursued
at this time in history and that the implications of falling behind on
desegregation goals can have devastating effects on blacks and the
country as a whole.
These issues also point up the need for more dedicated and well
trained legal manpower. Being in the forefront of evolving constitutional law around opportunities for minorities, women and other
disadvantaged persons and developing interpretations of various
statutes has been exciting for me. We have only begun to achieve some
major breakthroughs and now must also contend with internal conflicts as well as continue the development process. Regents of the
University of California v. Bakke22 , International Brotherhood of
Teamsters v. United States "3 , and Dayton Board of Education v.
Brinkman' are only expected aberrations. My major concern is that
many black students and others previously interested in this struggle
have passively accepted the notion that the fight is over, that the
system is wide open and opportunity is fully available to everyone!
Too many young people are less interested in public interest law than
in the high paying traditional practices with large corporations.
I was very impressed in reading the objectives of this school which
emphasized the relationship between Judeo-Christian ethics and the
professional responsibility of an attorney as an officer of the court and
a servant of society. I sincerely hope that emphasis here will encourage
many of you to follow the urgings of Justice Marshall and "participate
in serving the disadvantaged"I'-minorities, women and others.
22.
23.
24.
25.
ing).

98 S. Ct. 2733 (1978).
431 U.S. 324 (1977).
433 U.S. 406 (1977).
Ohralik v. Ohio St. B. Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 471 (1978) (Marshall, J., concurr-
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